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This is an FBI – DHS – HHS/CDC Coordinated Document 
Guidance on Initial Responses to a Suspicious Letter / Container
With a Potential Biological Threat 
 
A large number of potentially suspicious letters and packages continue to be 
reported to federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency response 
agencies nationwide. In some instances these letters or packages may include 
powders, liquids, or other materials. Federal, state, and local response agencies 
should be mindful of the potential for small-scale exposure, which could result 
from material contained in threatening or suspicious packages. While this 
guidance is generally focused on the initial response to potential biological 
threats, all personnel responding to such incidents must be aware of the potential 
for exposure to hazardous chemical and/or radiological materials in addition to 
biological hazards.  Additionally, there may be a threat posed from secondary 
releases or devices. Consistent with established protocols, response agencies 
should follow standard law enforcement procedures and hazard risk 
assessments in response to calls, and should pre-identify the relevant local 
public health points of contact to be notified in the event of a potential 
bioterrorism event.  
The following guidelines are recommendations for local responders, based on 
existing procedures (including recommendations from the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs). This document provides guidance on the initial 
response to a suspicious letter/container, while other follow-on response plans, 
such as portions of the National Response Plan (NRP), may be utilized if a threat 
is deemed credible. In general, these potential threats or incidents fall into one of 
five general scenarios. They are as follows:  
1. Letter/container with unknown powder-like substance and threatening 
communication (with or without illness):  
UNCLASSIFIED  
Since there is an articulated threat, it is likely that the substance was intentionally 
introduced into the package in an effort to validate that threat. An articulated 
threat itself (with or without the presence of a suspicious substance) is a federal 
crime and may also constitute a violation under state and local statutes. The local 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Coordinator and/or FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), a certified HAZMAT 
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unit, local law enforcement, and the local public health department should be 
notified. The role of Incident Commander (IC) will be assumed by the appropriate 
authority, as designated by state or local law. In many cases, the IC will be the 
most senior public safety officer (most likely the fire department chief or deputy 
chief, however, in many circumstances it may be a local sheriff or senior local or 
state police official).  As such, it is the responsibility of the IC to establish the 
Incident Command System (ICS) and to ensure that notifications of the above-
mentioned responders have been made or are in the process of being made. As 
the referenced agencies arrive, the IC will evolve into a Unified Command, as 
necessary.  
At this stage, and later again as necessary, the FBI will conduct a timely WMD 
threat assessment with local law enforcement/fire/HAZMAT personnel. 
Depending on the nature of the threat, this assessment may include relevant 
interagency partners.  This process utilizes coordination from FBI Headquarters 
elements to conduct an initial assessment of the credibility of the threat and 
provide technical support to responders who are on-scene. In coordination with 
recommendations from the threat assessment process and the unified command 
on-scene, an appropriately trained HAZMAT unit should screen evidence for the 
presence of chemicals and radiological material and double-bag in clear sealed 
bags (where possible), consistent with chain-of-custody requirements. Before 
packaging and when possible, photographs of the letter/container should be 
taken and relevant information should be documented, in coordination with the 
FBI WMD Coordinator.  Under NO CIRCUMSTANCES should an unprotected 
responder, such as a law enforcement officer, attempt to package an unknown 
substance.  
If this incident involves an unopened container such as a box, it must be 
evaluated by a certified bomb technician/explosives ordinance disposal 
personnel prior to being handled by HAZMAT. Any such letters/packages must 
also be evaluated by the HAZMAT unit for only a broad class of radiological and 
chemical threats prior to being released to law enforcement personnel for 
transport. This is required by the laboratory in an effort to protect the staff 
members who will ultimately be opening the container and performing definitive 
biological testing and/or forensic examinations.  
The FBI, or the responding law enforcement agency, will ensure that a certified 
HAZMAT team has performed necessary field safety screening before 
transporting to an appropriate laboratory. This field safety screening should be 
clearly documented and limited to screening for pH (for liquids), radioactivity, 
volatile organic compounds, flammable materials, and oxidizing agents. Definitive 
analysis will only be performed by the appropriate laboratory.      
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Page 2 of 6 
UNCLASSIFIED 
November 2, 2004 
A chain-of-custody form must be initiated along with an incident report. The FBI 
will then coordinate delivery of the evidence to the designated Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) laboratory for further testing and analysis. 
If individuals immediately present with illness in this scenario, the public health 
departments will have an increased role in the initial response. These issues are 
further addressed in the ‘Critical Response Issues for Scenario #1’ included 
below.   
If the FBI Headquarters-led threat credibility assessment process deems the 
threat to be credible, the FBI will immediately notify the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Homeland Security Operations 
Center (HSOC), and other appropriate federal agencies.  Appropriate response 
guidelines to a credible threat will be utilized from the NRP, including the 
Biological Annex and Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation 
Annex.  Depending on the nature and scale of the incident, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) may choose to help coordinate response activities 
based on NRP procedures which, at a minimum, may include coordinating a joint 
public affairs statement.   
2. Letter/container with a threat but no visible powder or substances 
present:  
Merely threatening the use of a chemical or biological agent is a violation of 
federal law and merits investigation. As in scenario #1, all of the responders 
should be notified. Although no powder may be visible to the eye, there could be 
trace amounts of material present that could represent a health risk and also 
provide critical forensic evidence required for further investigation and 
prosecution. Therefore, the guidance in Scenario #1 also applies to responses to 
a letter/container containing a threat with no visible powder or substance. 
3. Letter/container with unknown powder, no articulated threat, and no 
illness:  
As there is no threat and no one is ill, it must be determined if there is a logical 
explanation for the presence of this substance.  For example, HAZMAT teams 
have responded to a number of letters that contained crushed samples from 
vitamin and pain-relief companies. If a reasonable and defendable explanation 
can be given as to the source of the substance, that there is no articulated threat, 
and that no one is ill, then no further actions are necessary.  
If, however, a reasonable source cannot be determined or there is any 
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4. Letter/container with no visible powder, no threat, but recipients are ill:  
This scenario has the most potential for ambiguity and confusion. Those who 
come in contact with Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), or other biological 
pathogens/toxins, may not immediately appear symptomatic. Although no 
powder or substance may be available to be collected for environmental testing, 
public health officials may decide to utilize clinical samples from potentially 
exposed individuals. Additionally, in this scenario it may be difficult to determine if 
a letter/container is actually associated with the illness.  As there is no specific 
threat to investigate, this is primarily a public health and medical issue; but this 
scenario also represents a potential criminal act that should be jointly 
investigated by public health and law enforcement. The initial notifications will 
largely be the same as scenario #1, with public health taking a primary role in the 
response. While the primary concern is the treatment and well-being of the 
recipient, public health and law enforcement should maintain close contact, while 
public health determines the nature of the illness and law enforcement examines 
any relevant intelligence. Depending on the scale and nature of the incident, if 
HHS/CDC is notified they will maintain close contact and coordinate with DHS.  If 
a potential criminal nexus is identified, the FBI will conduct an initial threat 
assessment and initiate appropriate actions and notifications listed under 
scenario #1.   
5. Letter/container arrives with no powder, no threat, the recipient is not ill, 
but the recipient is concerned about the package:  
With strict regard to federal criminal statutes, no investigative actions are 
necessary in this matter. However, if other threat indicators are present such as 
excess postage, misspelled names, unusual odors/colors, etc., law enforcement 
and the United States Postal Inspection Service should be notified to evaluate it 
for potential hazards. If the assessment determines that the letter/container is 
“suspicious,” then appropriate steps outlined in scenario #1 would be initiated.  
 
Critical Response Issues for Scenario #1: 
 
1.  Request the assistance of the nearest certified hazardous materials response 
team to conduct risk assessments, field safety screening, sample (evidence) 
collection, decontamination, and other mitigation activities. Any sample 
(evidence) collection must be coordinated with law enforcement (FBI). 
 
2. Notify appropriate law enforcement (local, state and local FBI WMD 
coordinator/JTTF, postal inspectors) when a potential threat is identified. 
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3. Do not touch, move, or open any suspicious package until an initial hazard risk 
assessment of the package can be performed in coordination with HAZMAT 
personnel and law enforcement. 
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4. An initial threat credibility assessment will be coordinated via the local FBI 
WMD Coordinator and the FBI Counterterrorism Division’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU).  This will include the FBI Laboratory 
Division, Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and other select 
interagency subject matter experts, tailored for the specific threat.  This 
assessment includes an analysis of technical feasibility, operational practicability, 
behavioral resolve, and examination of any intelligence that might relate to the 
threat.  If the threat is determined to be credible, other appropriate federal 
agencies will be notified, to include DHS and HHS/CDC.  Additional information 
on this process is available from the NRP, including the Biological Annex and 
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. 
 
5. Contact your local public health department (who should in turn notify state 
authorities and the CDC) if there is a threat of public health exposure or 
environmental contamination exists.  HHS/CDC will then notify the HSOC, where 
appropriate.  
 
6. In coordination with law enforcement, always notify the U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service, whenever it appears that the threat was delivered through the U.S. 
Postal Service. Assist with ensuring that origin and tracking information is 
obtained from the package (ideally, photographs of the front and back). 
 
7. Treat the scene as a crime scene. Preserve evidence in coordination with law 
enforcement and ensure that materials are safely packaged. Take steps to retain 
enough suspicious material for: 
 
a.  Laboratory analysis; 
b.  Forensic examination of criminal evidence, regardless of whether the 
threat is ultimately determined to be accompanied by a hazardous 
material.  
 
8. Transfer custody of evidence to a law enforcement officer as soon as possible.  
Maintain chain of custody by obtaining a record of names and signatures every 
time custody of a suspicious material or sample for laboratory analysis changes 
hands. 
 
9.  Perform basic field safety screening of the substance to rule out explosives, 
radiation, flammability, corrosives, and volatile organic compounds prior to 
transporting the materials to the appropriate LRN, as coordinated with the FBI 
WMD Coordinator.  All field safety screening that is performed by responders 
should be clearly documented and shared with law enforcement and the LRN. 
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10.  In coordination with the local FBI WMD Coordinator (and/or a responding law 
enforcement entity), transport samples to the designated CDC-qualified LRN 
facility.  If field safety screening detects the presence of chemical or radiological 
hazards, the FBI WMD Coordinator will contact FBI Headquarters for guidance 
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regarding which laboratory is appropriate to perform the analysis. This will be 
done as part of the threat credibility assessment process noted above (see #4). 
 
11.  In coordination with public health and law enforcement, identify and list the 
names and contact information for anyone who may have been exposed to the 
suspicious substance so that they may be contacted when the LRN test results 
are available or if there is other additional information. If positive results are 
obtained, state and local public health departments will need to contact those 
potentially exposed as soon as possible to provide appropriate assistance (e.g., 
antibiotics, education, additional testing, vaccination, surveillance/symptom 
reporting). 
 
12.  In coordination with the FBI, identify a single point-of-contact for incident 
follow-up. 
 
13.  If LRN tests identify positive results for threat agents or a threat is 
determined to be credible, the FBI will immediately notify the DHS and other 
appropriate federal agencies to initiate relevant NRP actions, as necessary.  The 
DHS will work closely with the FBI, HHS/CDC and other agencies to ensure a 
coordinated response. 
 
Note on field screening 
 
Once activities are complete to address immediate public safety concerns, every 
effort must be made to preserve evidence necessary for public health and law 
enforcement investigations. 
 
In situations where biological threat agents are suspected, the item(s) should be 
field safety screened and immediately transported in law enforcement custody to 
an LRN laboratory. This should be done in coordination with the local FBI WMD 
Coordinator.   
 
Field safety screening should be limited to ruling out explosive devices, 
radiological materials, corrosive materials and volatile organic compounds.  
Currently, there are no definitive field tests for identifying biological 
agents.  Additional field testing can mislead response efforts by providing 
incorrect or incomplete results, and destroy limited materials critical for 
definitive laboratory testing required to facilitate any appropriate public 
health and law enforcement response.   
 
This information is provided for guidance.  Questions related to the content of this 
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